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  Abstract 
 
While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization 
of a market occurs, there are few theoretical or empirical analyses of this effect. This paper surveys 
the thin economic literature on the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories 
and observation of cartel behavior suggest that during successfully collusive periods prices become 
less variable and more negatively skewed compared to relatively competitive periods. Four empirical 
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  COLLUSION AND PRICE DISPERSION 
  by 
  John M. Connor 
 
  Introduction 
The effect of collusion on prices is a central concern of industrial economics.  An enormous 
theoretical and empirical literature analyzes the partial-equilibrium relationship between collusive 
conduct of sellers and the resulting increase in average prices.  There is also a very substantial body of 
work going back to the 1930s that examines the structural sources of price rigidity.  Most of these 
analyses assume nondiscriminating monopoly pricing. What is rather surprising is the near absence of 
theoretical or empirical analyses of the effects of collusive behavior on market price dispersion.  
 
The general objective of this paper is to ascertain whether changes in competitive regimes are 
associated with changes in the dispersion of market prices for homogeneous goods.  First, I examine 
theoretical arguments, in the context of classic cartel behavior that raises transaction prices or restricts 
output of homogeneous commodities.  Second, I present cite four empirical studies that verify that 




Stigler (1961) noted that significant price dispersion is typical of natural markets even for perfectly 
homogeneous goods in local geographic markets.  Stigler’s paper was seminal to a large body of 
research that linked search costs to market price dispersion (e.g., Salop 1977).  Given that price 
information is distributed unevenly across demand segments, sellers will have an incentive to offer 
their products at different prices to well-informed buyers and to ignorant buyers.  Rothschild (1973) 
criticized this Stiglerian branch of the literature as focusing too exclusively on only one side of the 
market – the demand side.  He suggested that price dispersion may be the result of firm strategies 
capitalizing on their knowledge of buyers’ search behavior. The theoretical literature that attempts to 
incorporate supply-side factors to explain price dispersion in homogeneous-goods markets is very thin.  
 
Carlson and Judd (1983) developed simple market-equilibrium models that generate price dispersion 
for homogenous goods by assuming that supplying firms have different costs of production.  Carlson 
and Judd’s analysis may have been one of the first to consider price dispersion in the context of an 
oligopolistic industry structure.
i  The number of producers is finite and fixed; thus, the industry may 
have small numbers and entry to the industry is blockaded.  Following Salop (1977), Carlson and Judd 
also assume that buyers differ according to the costliness of their individual costs of searching for 
prices. By making some additional structural assumptions, Carlson and Judd derive an equilibrium 
condition for the variance in prices.  Dispersion is related to two factors: the slope of the marginal cost 
curves and the number of firms.
ii  Dispersion is greater when the cost curves become relatively flat or 
when industry concentration declines. Fershtman (1982) proved that when buyer concentration 
increases, price dispersion decreases; in monopsony, the equilibrium price approaches the competitive 
price.  Dana (1999) verifies the concentration-dispersion results of Carlson and Judd in a somewhat 
different oligopolistic industry settling (one that mimics the airline industry).  
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A second strand of research considers market structure and price rigidity.  Means (1935) examined 
U.S. price deflation in the Great Depression and noted an association between price rigidity and the 
degree of industrial concentration.  Subsequent research has confirmed that oligopoly has tended to 
exhibited less flexibility in prices over time than more competitively structured markets (Carlton 
1986).  Price rigidity greater than cost fluctuations in oligopolistic settings is often attributed to a 
reluctance among the sellers to disturb an existing cooperative consensus. Except perhaps for quite 
large cost shocks, sellers prefer to avoid the possibility of a price war that might follow a unilateral 
price change.   
 
Game theoretic models of cartels have considered the phenomenon of price rigidity.  The standard 
model for studying explicit collusion is the infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which symmetric 
firms observe past market prices to form conjectures.  Two celebrated models come to opposite 
conclusions. Green and Porter (1984) suggest that cartels exacerbate price variability relative to what 
would be observed under competition, whereas Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predict price changes 
that are countercyclical.  Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2002) provide a third extension to the 
standard infinitely repeated game.  In their model, collusive firms with varying costs know each 
other’s past and current prices, but they do not know their co-conspirators’ costs.  The collusive 
scheme is designed to make price wars unattractive and to have collusive informational costs.  When 
firms are patient enough, Athey et al. demonstrate that optimal collusion “… is characterized by a 
rigid-pricing scheme, in which firms select the same price…in each time period, whatever their cost 
levels” (p.4).  Thus, their model demonstrates collusive price rigidity in a rigorous manor, verifying 
the informal insights of economists writing decades before.  Although Athey et al. provide the most 
sophisticated theoretical basis for expecting a shift in price variance as a consequence of explicit 
collusion, it should be noted that neither this paper nor any other discuss skewness or kurtosis of prices 
in oligopolistic industry settings. 
 
There has been a rebirth of interest among industrial economists in studying the organization and 
conduct of formal cartels.  Many of these studies have been motivated by the discovery of hundreds of 
international cartels and the attendant record sanctions imposed by the world’s antitrust authorities 
since the mid 1990s (e.g., Connor 2001and 2003).  Generalizing from these cases can offer insights 
into the price-dispersion effects of collusion. 
 
Cartelization brings about several changes in industry structure and conduct that are likely to affect 
price dispersion.
3   First, cartelization is formally equivalent to a horizontal merger, which effectively 
raises concentration to as high as the monopoly level if all sellers join the cartel.  Second, cartels 
almost always attempt to prevent entry in order to extend the duration and profitability of the cartel.  If 
not successful in preventing entry, cartels will attempt to coerce outsiders to join the cartel.  Third, to 
reduce the number of collusive dimensions, cartels usually will adopt conventional industry exchange 
practices or will agree to create uniform terms of exchange, such as common delivery charges, 
standard price premiums for alternative grades, payment schedules, price protection clauses in supply 
contracts, and so forth. 
 
All three aspects of cartelization suggest a reduction in price variance.  Highly effective cartels, like 
nondiscriminating monopolies with no moral hazards, charge a single price. Moreover, monopoly 
pricing reduces buyer search costs because bargaining over terms of sale is eliminated.  If the cartel 
also divides markets or customer lists among themselves, then buyer search costs can be totally  
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eliminated.  By preventing entry or recruiting entrants into the cartel, price variation is almost certainly 
likely to be reduced.  Moreover, even fringe firms that remain outside the cartel have an incentive to 
price up to the cartel’s level (umbrella pricing). 
Some cartels may rationalize production among their members, much as would be done by a 
multiplant monopolist.  High cost facilities would be closed as output was reduced, thus reducing 
some variability in producer costs and the incentive to cheat.  High prices would likely dampen 
expected future market growth and this in turn would reduce the incentive for plant expansions and 
upgrades in lower cost facilities.  Thus, both changes in technology due to cartelization would reduce 
variability in prices. 
 
Demand shocks have been suggested to be one source of price dispersion in oligopolistic markets.  In 
order to manage an effective conspiracy, cartels often establish committees or secretariats to collect 
and share market sales intelligence.  Alternatively, cartels may be operated in tandem with trade 
associations that perform the same functions.  These activities may, by pooling information on 
industry trends, improve a cartel’s ability to anticipate demand shocks, thereby reducing price 
dispersion. 
 
Cartels fix prices either by announcing list prices to buyers and by agreeing to sell only at list or by 
agreeing to sell at some lower “floor” (minimum) price or at a “target” (average) price below list.  
Some cartels also agree to eliminate or restrict discounts, which will reduce the variance but cause 
negative skewness.  Cheating is almost always a problem in cartels.   Because the target price is high 
by historical or cost standards, few if any sales by cartel members would occur at supra-target prices.  
Cheating would cause prices to become negatively skewed compared to the same market without 




There are few empirical studies of price dispersion in the context of homogenous oligopolistic market 
structures.  Borenstein and Rose (1994) find that discriminatory price dispersion in airline fares in 
identical routes is explained by costs of whether cartel members cheated on the cartel’s fixed list 
prices (pp. 48-56).  Ellison develops an innovative method for detecting secret price cuts by cartel 
members.  He finds that secret price cuts occurred during 25% of the cartel period and that the price 
discounts averaged about 20%.  Ellison’s work suggests that cartels induce negative skewness in 
pricing during periods of effective price increases; there was no evidence of price premiums above list 
(agreed) prices, only discounts. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2004) examine the effects of a bid-rigging cartel 
in frozen fish sold to the U.S. Department of Defense on price variance by comparing the variance 
during the cartel’s effective period with the period after the existence of a formal grand-jury 
investigation became known to the conspirators.  The average price dropped 23% after the cartel was 
uncovered (September 1988 to September 1989), but more to the point the variance increased by 
145% compared with the variance during the conspiracy period (January 1986 to July 1988). 
 
An alleged U.S. cartel fixed the prices of at least two products A and B in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Connor 2003).  The delivered prices of all sellers in the cartel were available for thousands 
of deliveries during an eight-year period, one year before the cartel operated and seven years of 
effective cartel operation.  Three measures of price dispersion were calculated for the two 
products (Table 1).  The prices of these products are quite low (less than $0.25 per pound) and  
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they are difficult to transport, so after-delivery arbitrage is unlikely.
4  For both products price 
dispersion declines, leptokurtosis develops, and skewness is negative and much lower during the 
cartel period.  Although not shown, these statistics follow the same pattern for all seven years and 
for each company in the vast majority of cases.  These results are consistent with cartel conduct.  
(Perhaps the only unexpected result is that prices were positively skewed in the more competitive 
period, a pattern not suggested by economic theory.)  
 




of Variation  Kurtosis  Skewness 
 
Product A: 
   
     Pre-cartel  0.196  4.94  1.053 
     Cartel  0.134  3.58  0.401 
Product  B:     
     Pre-cartel  0.159  10.57  1.947 
     Cartel  0.127    3.41  0.179 
 
Note:  Pre-cartel period is one full year before cartel began to fix prices.  Cartel period is seven years 
(averaged).  Based on thousands of delivered prices by five sellers to one city in the United States.  
Data are confidential. 
 
    Antitrust Policy Implications 
 
Writers appraising the effectiveness of antitrust laws often identify the fight against price-fixing 
conspiracies as a signal achievement (Posner 2001).  However, since 1995, antitrust agencies have 
been wrestling with a renewed outbreak of global cartels of massive proportions (Connor 2003; 
Evenett et al. 2001).  The legal burden of proof of illegal cartel behavior rests with prosecutors or 
plaintiffs.  In order to obtain restitution in civil cases or punitive sanctions in criminal cases, 
prosecutors must present persuasive economic evidence of monetary damages.  The five methods of 
proof accepted by U.S. courts have deficiencies that can be exploited in forensic settings by 
defendants’ economic experts (Connor 2004). 
  
Quite simply, the availability of an additional, independent method of detecting collusion in 
natural markets would have two significant benefits for anticartel enforcement.  First, the method 
of analysis proposed here offers a highly rigorous standard of proof based on broadly accepted 
statistical measures.  Allowing evidence on price dispersion to prove the existence or 
nonexistence of collusive price behavior would narrow the scope of forensic debates.  The 
concepts of price dispersion are relatively simple to explain and illustrate to jurors and jurists 
alike.  (The same cannot be said for some methods of analysis focusing on price averages, some 
of which require an understanding of algebraic oligopoly models or advanced econometric 
techniques).  Thus, evidence on price dispersion in conspiracy cases may well reduce the length, 
complexity, and costs of litigation. 
  
Second, the availability of an additional tool of detection of collusive behavior will have  
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deterrence value.  Transactions prices can be collected from the parties most likely to allege the 
existence of an illegal cartel – the customers.  Thus, tests of price dispersion can be applied to 
samples of prices provided by suspicious buyers to prosecutors or plaintiffs attorneys prior to 
launching a formal investigation or filing a civil suit.  Moreover, as the next section will explain, 
a sample of prices from a narrow geographic market will suffice for detection purposes, keeping 
analytical costs low.  In other words, analysis of price dispersions can be part of a rigorous 
screening process that would winnow probably collusive episodes from unlikely ones and 
winnable suits from those likely to fail in the courts.  Thus, evidence from changes in price 
dispersions over time can reduce both Type I and Type II errors in cartel detection. 
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i Mund (1960) notes that identical bids on project tenders is viewed as strong evidence of collusion.  Elzinga 
(1984) surveys cartel studies and  mentions almost in passing  “…the presumption that prices under cartels 
should be higher, less variable over time, and more uniform at a point in time, all other things equal (p. 22.”  
There are no sources given for this notion. 
ii A third factor, the density of demand, “plays a minor role” (p. 490) and disappears when the cost curves 
become flat. 
3 There are studies of cartel stability that examine the variation in prices as a measure of the degree of cartel 
discipline across multiple episodes (see, for example Suslow 2001).  Classic examples of reversion to more 
competitive pricing conduct are price wars.  However, these studies are motivated by an interest in why cartel 
consensus breaks down from time to time or whether price-stabilization schemes are successful. They do not 
examine intra-episode price variation. 
4 The product must be delivered in rail cars or truck trailers that cannot be used for any other product. 